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THE TABLET.——No. XX.

"However romantic it may seem, it is very true, that there are a sort of people who take great pains to be idle."

IT is worthy of remark that men, who have *nothing to do*, seldom have any leisure; while those, who are in good earnest engaged in business, have spare time enough. The latter have leisure because they attend to their own business, and nothing else; the former want leisure because they do not attend to their own business, but to every thing else. I have among my acquaintance a character of each of these descriptions; one of them is named ATTENTUS, the other UBIQUITUS. It happened the other morning they both called on me, nearly at the same time.

ATTENTUS informed me, that having a little leisure, he had waited on me to adjust an account that lay between us. He tarried but a few minutes, proceeded deliberately, and accomplished what he came for.—UBIQUITUS ran up to the door to acquaint me with the great hurry he was in, and to apologize for his not being able to make me a visit; he continued with me upwards of an hour, without having any business, and spent most of the time in lamenting his amazing haste.—It may not be amiss to observe that ATTENTUS is largely concerned in mercantile affairs, and is an extensive dealer in West-India goods. No person ever managed his concerns with more method and prudence; and by doing every thing as it ought to be done, and finishing one thing before he begins another, he is at no time in hurry and confusion, and often finds moments of leisure and relaxation.

UBIQUITUS, on the other hand, though his whole life is spent in trifles, takes hold even of trifles at the wrong end; engages in many trivial things at once, and finishes no part of what he undertakes. He seems to have no determinate object of pursuit, and his friends are at a loss to conjecture how he employs himself; while he is incessantly complaining of the pressure and anxiety, which are occasioned by the multiplicity of his affairs. The reader will form a clearer idea of the difference of these characters, if I relate exactly the conversation that passed the other morning.

ATTENTUS called just at nine o'clock, and found me at breakfast. After informing me what he wished, he requested me to take my breakfast leisurely, as he could, without inconvenience, wait a few minutes. I rose from the table and handed him the account I had stated, and mentioned that he could examine it, at his leisure.—"It is my practice," said he, "to complete every thing of this kind on the spot." He soon went through the examination, made his remarks, and was again at leisure. I enquired of him if he knew how the wind stood, and whether the British Packet would sail that day? "I know very well," said he, "how the wind is, because I am looking for a vessel from the West-Indies; but I know nothing of the Packet, as I do not deal at Europe. It runs in my mind, however, that I heard somebody speaking of the matter; but who the person was, or what he said, I do not remember, as I never charge my memory with what does not relate to my own affairs." In examining some papers I was rather slower than common, and desired ATTENTUS to excuse me, as I was at the Theatre the evening before, and had not taken my usual hours of sleep. "Theatre," cried he, "are the players in town; how long have they been here?" Six weeks replied I. "Have they indeed," said ATTENTUS, "I never heard a word of it before." But, continued I, do you not read the newspapers? "I take the newspapers," answered he, "but I only peruse such parts of them as give information about my particular line of business." It happened in the course of conversation, that I asked him if he had attended the debates of Congress. He told me he had once been in the gallery, that his neighbours should not say he was an Antifederalist; but that he thought the business would go on as well without his company, as with it, and he should attend no more. If you have leisure, said I, you should be present at some of the debates, as they concern the mercantile interest, who in the first instance must pay the duties. "As to leisure," said he, "I have some, but my attending at the gallery will neither make the duties more or less. I shall find out what they are fast enough. The old duties were laid without my knowledge, but I soon had people after me to put me in mind of the business. Besides the members of Congress will not stay in my store and watch for customers while I am in their gallery." ATTENTUS was about leaving me, when I mentioned that I would walk a little way with him. "Well," said he, "if you are going my way I have no objection." Just as we were at the door, UBIQUITUS came up and interrupted my walk.

He took me by the hand, and with a perplexed countenance, said he never was in such an hurry in his life, that he could scarce stay to apologize for not staying longer. However, while he was making these complaints, he followed me fairly into the house. I urged him to take a chair and tarry a few minutes. "No," replied he, I could not wait ten minutes, if you would give me ten guineas. I have every thing to do this morning. It was my intention to have wrote half a dozen letters before this hour of the day, but I shall not write one before dinner; and after all, shall not find leisure to hear the debates of Congress." I continued to urge him to take a seat and recover a little from his fatigue; but he seemed offended at the request, and fell into a run of conversation that I thought he never would have finished. He held one of the buttons of my coat with his left hand, that my impatience should not force me from him; and extended his right arm, that he might the more emphatically express the necessity of leaving me immediately. As nearly as I can recollect, the following are a few of the remarks and queries he made: "*Have you heard of the arrivals at Philadelphia from the East-Indies? There was an excellent play last night, but I could not find time to attend. Do you not think the address from the Methodist Clergy to The President, was modestly done? The Bank I am told are sparing of their discounts now adays. Who do they talk of as Chief Justice of the United States? I fear I shall lose a beaver hat respecting the issue of the election for governor. What a perplexity it is to be so hurried; you see my hair is not combed, and I suppose my barber will call several times before I can be ready for him. My letters are unanswered for a long while past.*" But, enquired I, do you not notice your letters as soon as you receive them? ATTENTUS tells me he never leaves any thing undone, after the proper time of doing it. "Well he may," replied UBIQUITUS, "for he has nothing to do but to take care of his business. The case is quite otherwise with me. I have a whole chest of papers lying in heaps and confusion, and I do not even recollect the contents of half of them." I began to be weary of standing, and as my friend could not tarry long enough to sit down, I proposed a walk by way of relief to myself. UBIQUITUS joined in the proposal, and as he had much business abroad, and I had none, I left it with him to direct the course of our rambles. "We will go," said he, "stop! I have so many places to visit I hardly know which to call at first. Upon the whole I will accompany you wherever you please." My walk did not give the relief I expected, for UBIQUITUS stopped to speak with so many persons in the streets, that I was almost as still, as before I left the house; and I am not certain I should have escaped from my confinement for several hours, if a gentleman had not invited UBIQUITUS to go with him to a billiard table. This suggestion so pleased him, that he took his leave of me, and I did not imagine I should see him again that day. However it happened UBIQUITUS and myself were to dine at the same place. I called at the hour of invitation, and none of the company were missing but UBIQUITUS. When dinner had waited for him nearly half an hour, he came in so extremely exhausted with the fatigues of the morning, that I feared he had lost his appetite. He expressed a little regret that the company had waited for him, but observed, that they knew so well how difficult it was for him to be exact to his appointments, that no apology was requisite. I perceived, however, that his hurry did not prevent his doing justice to the dinner and wine, and indeed before evening he seemed well satisfied with the position he had taken.

SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL STATE OF AMERICA.

[*Continued from our last.*]

IN my last number I ventured a few general observations on the nature of some of the executive departments, and now proceed to suggest some further ideas on the subject of a secretary of domestic affairs and commissioner of trade, to be permanently established at the seat of government; whose duty it shall be to collect into one focus all possible information, from the various parts of the continent, which immediately or virtually respects agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, those pillars of national prosperity—and towards this design he shall correspond with the custom-house officers in the different States, and from them obtain accurate details of the amount of our exports, and imports, and their specific qualities—the number of American vessels employed in our commerce, with the number of men navigating them—their rates of tonnage, and the nature of the trade they carry on; also how many foreign vessels, and their channels of trade:—And in estimating the value of our imports, not to include the charge of duties—they being paid by the internal consumer, ought not to stand as a debit against the nation—but the duties on manufactures exported may be included in the credit, being paid by the foreign consumer:—This officer will also pay a nice attention to the increase of the raw materials and progress of the manufactures of the country—ascertaining what each State annually produces and manufactures, and what proportion the raw materials of home growth bear to those imported—and be able, well to discern what species of manufactures can in our present state be with advantage promoted, and without injury to other interests of the community—for this end he will encourage the introduction of machines so beneficial in a country having but few hands—he will also notice the population of the United States, their annual consumption, and the ratio of supply and demand—he will devise means to improve our agriculture—and promote our navigation—form plans for failing our vessels least expensively—thereby assisting our carrying trade—he will explore the various channels for the extension of our commerce, &c.—When we consider the many difficulties which have attended the construction of our revenue system, for want of proper information from the several States in the Union, on many subjects included in this plan—when we view the advantage that must result from having persons officially possessed of such an accurate knowledge in the general state of the community, as to be able on a proposition for levying any imposts or other taxes, to determine how particular interests will be effected thereby—when we contemplate the benefit of having a trial-balance of our national trade, for correcting present and avoiding future errors—when we reflect on the great spring which the encouragement of trade and commerce gives to agriculture and manufactures—when in general we know the need of guarding the various fluctuations of the different interests in a State—of ballancing them and directing them to one common centre—the public good:—I think these united considerations will evince the propriety of such an establishment as above alluded to, from the tendency it will have to communicate general information, to diffuse national views, establish national sentiments, to promote national interests, and to produce that concentration, system, and harmony, which must form the basis of our country's future prosperity and happiness.

In respect to a land-office, I have my doubts of the principle which in a degree leads to the necessity of such an establishment, viewing any encouragement to emigrate in the present state of our population, as building up the interior part of this country at the expence of the atlantic settlements, as totally opposed to an early attempt for manufacturing, as producing an undue proportion of certain interests, and being at present of no essential advantage to the progress of agriculture; but it has been here objected, that the spirit of emigration cannot be well stopped, or greatly checked—this being granted, it will be doubtless most politic to methodize the settlement of this western country, and pursue every means to encrease their future attachment and obedience to the present government.

AMERICANUS.

SKETCH OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS.

In the House *of* REPRESENTATIVES *of the* UNITED STATES.

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1789.

[A SKETCH *of the* DEBATE *on the* BILL *for establishing the* EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT *for* FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *which took place on* Tuesday *last, upon Mr.* WHITE*'s moving to strike out the words* "to be removed from office by The President of the United States.]

Mr. WHITE observed, that the constitution had provided specifically only for the removal of the Judges of the Supreme Court—but as it had associated the Senate with the President in the appointment of officers, it was proper that the power of removal in the latter case, should be jointly exercised, as in the former.

Mr. SMITH (S. C.) was in sentiment with Mr. WHITE—he observed, that one of these two ideas are just, either that THE PRESIDENT had the power by the constitution, or he had not—If the power is vested in him by the constitution, the clause is nugatory—if it is not, the House can have no right to give it—This deligation of power is unconstitutional, agreeably to the idea of some very ingenious commentators upon the subject, who have asserted, that the Senate should have a voice in the removal as well as the appointment of officers.—The author of the pieces under the signature of PUBLIUS, one of the most valuable performances extant—has fully expressed this sentiment.

If the constitution is examined with attention, we shall find that no such power is directly or impliedly given to the President—the departments of government are defined—the powers

vested in The President are declared—but no such power as this is pointed out—so far from it, the mode of removal is particularly specified, and that is upon conviction, after impeachment before the Senate: As the constitution is thus express, it follows, that this house can have no right to confer the power designated in the clause.

The reason for giving this power is the necessity of removal in cases of incapacity; but for what cause can a man be removed from office, but for mal-practices or misdemeanors? Is sickness or ignorance a sufficient reason? and who is to judge of incapacity or ignorance, unless by reason of either some offence is committed? In that case the removal is not for *incapacity*, but for the *offence*, and let me ask for the instance of dismission for the former?

This clause invests a power in The President, which will be liable to great abuses; for we are not always to expect a chief magistrate in whom such intire confidence can be placed as in the present—the splendor of whose virtues, some gentlemen, appear to be so dazzled with, as to lose sight of a proper respect to futurity. The constitution is not calculated upon the idea of having the chair always so well filled; checks and guards are therefore provided—this is our only directory: An officer who is subjected to the whims of a capricious man, will be in an abject, dependent state: a mere slave; what is the consequence? we subject a fellow citizen to lose his reputation, his property, his living without a trial; men of independent principles will be cautious of placing themselves in such a situation; as a President might have round him those who envious of the honors and emoluments of persons in office, would be constantly intriguing and insinuating suspicions to effect their removal.

To be removed from office without a specified crime, or without a trial is contrary to the spirit of the constitution; is contrary to the free sentiments of this people: Some gentlemen have supposed that the present case is one of those to be provided for by legislative regulations; it appears however from the foregoing observations, that the mode proposed is unconstitutional; and upon the whole it is evident, that as the power is not given to the President by the constitution, it ought not to be delegated to him.

Mr. HUNTINGTON followed Mr. SMITH, and made a few observations upon "responsibility," shewing that its importance was principally derived from the character in which it was fixed, and not from the idea in itself considered—he was opposed to the clause as dangerous.

Mr. SEDGWICK adverted to several cases, which would render removals from office necessary, which were not provided for by the constitution—and which the mode by impeachment from the length of process, and various difficulties always realized, would be found totally inadequate to remedy—he pointed out the necessity of speedy and prompt decision, when a man had become odious and unpopular in his office, without committing a positive offence when his talents were found deficient, and there was an incurable negligence and indolence in his attention to the duties of his office—when his political principles were become odious to the people, and his talents, instead of being exerted for the public good, were directed to prosecuting schemes of personal aggrandizement, in such and similar cases, it would be necessary to adopt something more summary than the slow, desultory process by impeachment.

Upon the principle of gentlemen, opposed to the clause—the Senate must be always in session—This he hoped would not take place—but in the absence of this body, what was to be done? must the public interest be sacrificed? must justice be delayed, by keeping an unworthy officer in his post, till the Senate could be collected from the extremities of this continent?

The danger of abuses had been enlarged upon; but was their no danger on that account from the Senate? the argument in his opinion, applied with equal force—and the power in the hands of a body chosen from various parts of the union, under the impression of various and different principles, was as liable to abuse if not more so, than if placed in the hands of the man, whom the united voice of the people should call to the office of chief magistrate.

Mr. MADISON coincided with Mr. SMITH, so far as that we ought to adhere strictly to the spirit and meaning of the constitution—He was however opposed to the motion for striking out the clause.—The present question was considered in various points of view; it therefore came properly before the legislature to decide upon it: If the proposed clause is merely a declaration of the constitution, it can do no harm; If it relates to a doubtful part, it lays with the whole legislature to give an explanation: And if the constitution is totally silent, Congress may use its discretion: The power is a high and important one; and therefore a decision merits a full and free discussion of both sides of the question: When it is considered, that the chief magistrate is to be selected from the mass of the citizens, by the united suffrages of three millions of people; notwithstanding the weakness incident to a popular election, he could not suppose that a vicious or bad character would be chosen.

If there is a country upon earth in which an effectual security is provided against the elevation of an unworthy man to the first seat in government, it is the United States. It is evidently the policy of the Constitution, that great responsibility should be lodged in The President, with respect to the executive department; but this responsibility is abated or destroyed so far as the officers to whom the duties of this department are committed, are not amenable to him: Should the Senate be associated with The President in the power of removal, the officers would very probably rest the retaining their places upon the favor of the Senate, in preference to that of The President, and would accordingly consider themselves as accountable principally to the Senate; in that case all executive responsibility would be impracticable, or the expectation of it, unjust.

The officers may by connecting themselves with the Senate in a cabal against The President, lay a foundation for perpetual discord, and in that way effectually destroy his responsibility, and defeat the expectation of the people from the institution of an independent executive branch.

From an attentive examination of the Constitution upon its true principle, it is at least problematical whether the House is not tied down to the construction adopted in this clause of the bill.

So far as particular powers are invested in different and particular departments, a different appropriation of those powers is not warranted by the constitution; it will therefore be highly improper to blend those powers: If the executive powers are invested in The President, the legislature may not interfere in the exercise of those powers.

No gentleman will say, that the judicial power should be vested in any body, other than that designated by the constitution: The executive power is in the hands of The President, and is there any particular exceptions to this general principle? There is an exception: The constitution has declared, that in the appointment of officers, the Senate shall have a voice, unless in cases of inferior officers, the law shall otherwise direct.

Has Congress a right to extend this exception? No. If the constitution has in general vested all executive powers in one branch, the legislature has no right to diminish or modify them, any farther than is expressly provided by the constitution.

The question resolves itself into this: Is the power of displacing officers an executive, or legislative power? I conceive (said he) that no power can be more compleatly executive than that of appointing, inspecting and controuling those, who have the immediate administration of the laws. If the constitution had not provided, that in the appointment of officers, The President should have the advice and consent of the Senate; would it not be evident that he being possessed of the executive powers would have a right to appoint them? Could Congress in this case, have a right to say that the concurrence of the Senate should be necessary in such appointments? Most certainly not: And if not how can it be said with propriety, that Congress has a right to associate these branches, in order to dismiss them.

This clause may therefore be considered as explanatory of the constitution, and if the foregoing reasoning is just, it comports with its spirit and meaning; but if it is a doubtful point, it is the duty of the legislature to decide upon it.

Mr. VINING observed, that he was sorry that this question was again made the subject of discussion.

The committee who brought in the bill, (of which he had the honor to be one) thought themselves obliged by the former decision of the House to insert the clause now objected to: The House, (said he) has determined that the power of removing officers, shall be lodged where the responsibility resides: The circuitous rout of impeachments has been well pointed out by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Sedgwick) the slow, dilatory and inefficient process by that mode, is demonstrated by universal experience. The case of Warren Hastings is an eternal stigma upon the system of Impeachments; What delays! what suspension of the public service!

Suppose a secretary of foreign affairs in this situation: The forms of a full trial; the collecting of evidences; the charges and arguments of the parties, and a deliberate decision, may perpetuate the business for years.

It certainly could not be in the contemplation of the Senate to take away the responsibility of The President: Incapacity is not impeachable: Must the public service suffer by depriving The President of the power to remove an officer thus circumstanced? I trust, Sir, the clause will not be struck out.

Mr. WHITE supported his motion—He considered impeachments unnecessary to be applied to upon all occasions: They were proper as they respected officers who were to hold their places during good behavior: these were The President, Vice-President, and the Supreme Judges; but as the principle, that the power of removal ought to rest with the power that appointed did not apply to the two first, there was no mode of removal for them, but by impeachment before the Senate.

He had no idea that such an officer as the Minister of Foreign Affairs should not be removed but by impeachment: It might be highly inexpedient to have the reasons of his dismission publicly known: In that case, The President, with advice of Senate, might have power to remove him without assigning any cause: The constitution implied this, as it provided that the JUDGES only should hold their places during good behavior.

He differed from his colleague in the principle which he had advanced, That the whole executive power was vested exclusively in The President in all cases where the Constitution had not specified an exception: The Constitution had given the Senate a voice in the appointment of officers, and they certainly had a power to dismiss from office.

It had been urged, that the power could be more safely entrusted with The President; but the House was bound to adhere to the Constitution, that prescribed certain limits, which the legislature could not exceed: No officer could be legally dismissed without a trial; upon the clause in debate, an officer might be retained in office, contrary to the sentiments of the Legislature.

To obviate the difficulties which it had been suggested would arise upon the plan which he thought the constitution pointed out, he supposed that The President might be invested with the power of a temporary suspension and appointment of officers in the recess of the Senate; but an absolute power for those purposes cannot be given consistently with the Constitution.

Mr. BOUDINOT was in favor of the clause; he observed, That much had been said upon the subject; but its importance was so great, as rendered a full discussion necessary, and could not be considered as time lost. If the power contended for, could in the least infringe the Constitution, or the rights of the several branches of the Legislature, he would most heartily oppose it. But the clause he considered as a legislative construction of the Constitution, which it was highly necessary to settle at the present time. Nothing can be shewn to prove that removals are to take place only by impeachments. The reasoning of those who contend for the power's being invested in The President, does not conclude against the remedy by impeachment; it only proves that there is another mode provided in the Constitution.

It is proper and necessary that the power of removal should reside somewhere; but this power does not prevent impeachments of any officer, however protected by the favor of him in whom that power is vested. The Constitution says, that an officer shall be removed by impeachment; but it does not say, that he shall not be removed without impeachment: The Constitution does not say, that that shall be the only mode: It has given the Senate a voice in appointing; but this by no means implies a right of removing. Suppose the President should complain to the Senate of the misconduct of an officer, what would be the consequence, if the Senate should take upon themselves to be judges? Would they not call upon the accused to state the reasons of his conduct? Would not such an investigation place the President in a situation inferior to the Senate? And should the Senate decide in favor of the officer, what would The President's situation then be?

He considered the Senate as the only security and barrier between the House and the President, and in this view, as a Court of Judicature, to operate as a check between them. This security ought to be in a situation always to be appealed to, and to guard against his misconduct: If the Senate is not this independent body, there is no resort left to the House: If the President was unduly attached to an officer, who was obnoxious to the people, and was determined to support him; if in consequence of the public clamor, he should be compelled to bring the matter before the Senate, and they should decline removing him—would they be unbiassed and unprejudiced to hear the impeachment that should be made by the House? They would be improper judges, having pre-judged and pledged themselves to acquit the offender: The same difficulty might occur in an attempt to impeach the President for refusing to dismiss an unfaithful and odious officer.

In cases of sickness or incapacity, if the President is not invested with a power of removal, will the people submit to such officers? Divest the President of this power, and you destroy his responsibility: We ought not to leave this matter to the slow operations of law: The government in this case would suffer an interregnum: We must leave this responsibility with The President, or we shall effectually defeat the operation of the Constitution.

Mr. SMITH (S. C.) in reply observed, That gentlemen on the opposite side of the question were not consistent with themselves. Some contended that the power of removal was given by the Constitution; others that this House ought to give it; the question therefore recurred, either the Constitution has given the power to the President when it is unnecessary; or it has not given it, in which case it is improper for this House to do it. Gentlemen have said, that it is the duty of the Legislature to construe this point; but this House has no right to expound the Constitution—neither has the Senate: It will be an intringement of the rights of the Judiciary: If one House has this right, the other is equally entitled to it, and on a question in which each was concerned, they would see with different eyes, and disagree in their expositions. Much mischief has arisen in the several States from legislative constructions of their Constitutions. It appears to me (Mr. SMITH further observed,) that this House has no more right to invest the President with this power, than we have to invest ourselves with it.

The mode of impeachment for crimes will not be so tedious and dilatory as some gentlemen seem to suppose: There will be no juries in such cases; and to be protected from the summary modes used in foreign despotic countries, is the glorious privilege of freemen. Gentlemen have said that the Constitution makes no provision for cases of delirium, incapacity, &c. let the law then provide for such cases. The power contended for is not drawn from precedent; there is no such power given by the State Constitutions, upon the principles of which, the system under which we are now deliberating is founded. Mr. SMITH concluded by adverting to several historical facts—and by observing that the forms of law were designed to secure the rights of the subject, and might prove highly necessary to guard a deserving officer from injustice, and popular phrenzy.

Mr. GERRY was opposed to the clause—He supposed it would invest a power in the President to annul the most essential checks of the Constitution: He thought that if it was considered as merely a question of expediency, there was danger of making a breach in the constitution; if it is a constitutional question, every idea of expediency should be abandoned. He was for a strict adherence to the constitution; he conceived that no construction of that, would warrant delegating such a power to the President: It was conceded by some gentlemen in favour of the clause, that the constitution was not definite upon the subject, and if there was a doubt, it did not allow the liberty of a discretionary construction.

Mr. AMES observed, that every question which touches the constitution is a serious question: In order to obtain the advantages which are to be expected from the constitution, powers are delegated. To guard against abuses, checks are provided: That an officer should be removed, when the reasons which gave rise to his appointment, no longer exist, will not be disputed; but the question is, how this is to be done? There is no government in which the officers hold their places during good behaviour: The officers of the judiciary, from the nature and peculiar delicacy of their trust, were formed into a distinct branch, and hold their offices upon that tenure; but in respect to others, acting in aid of the President, who were appointed upon differed principles, and for different purposes, it is necessary that they should hold their places during pleasure: The confidence which the government has in the virtues and abilities of an officer, should be the only ground of his appointment, and the only bond of connection between him and his principal; when that confidence ceases, the power under whose direction he acts, shoul dcertainly have power to displace him.

There may be numerous and various causes of removal, which do not amount to a crime: If it is admitted that officers ought to be dismissed when their continuance operates to the injury of government, whether innocent or not of any crime, the only question then is, how and by whow they shall be displaced? Impeachments are not the only mode to be resorted to. In the British government officers are removed immediately when they become odious and can no longer render service to the public: While the forms of impeachment are preparing, the mischief may be done: It may as frequently be necessrry to prevent as to punish crimes. The situation and advantages of the supreme executive, will furnish him with the means to detect a villainous design, before it is ripe for execution; he might, for example, discover in the officers of the treasury a project for embezzling the public money; some sudden and decisive remedy would in such case be indispensable.

It is generally agreed, that removals will be a proper remedy; the question is by whom? If the constitution is against the power's, being vested in The President, there is an end of the enquiry. The committee ought to be clear that the constitution is opposed. The gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Madison) has made so many just remarks to prove the constitutionality of this power, that it is unnecessary to go over the ground again.

If it should be granted that the constitution is silent, it certainly comes within the cognizance of the Legislature. The powers of the several branches ought not to be blended. The President is the executive; this is confessedly an executive power: It is not creating a new power; it already exists, and is as great now as it will be when particularly appropriated. Officers should have the terror of punishment constantly held over their heads for delinquency.—The immediate influence and controul of the President over his assistants is necessary, it is the essence of good government. That responsibility which is so important and absolutely necessary, can never be found in the Senate: besides, the blending of distinct powers always produces a corruption of those powers; for this reason the Senate should never have the power of interfering: Protection for protection in office, will be the consequence, and a numerous train of evils more easily foreseen than remedied.—Upon the whole, there appears to be three opinions upon the subject before the committee, the first is, that investing this power in the President, is against the constitution—the second, that it is not—and the third is, that the constitution is silent with respect to it: It is therefore necessary that the House should come to a declaration; if that declaration is right, it will become a rule; if not, the Judges will determine it.

Mr. LIVERMORE was opposed to the clause, and urged several reasons for striking it out.——Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17.

In committee of the whole, upon the bill for establishing the department of foreign affairs—the question whether the clause which invests the President with the power of removing officers should be struck out, still under consideration, and was largely debated; but no decision was had upon the question when the committee rose, and the House adjourned.

THURSDAY, JUNE 18.

A petition from ROBERT FRAZIER was read and laid on the table.

The Senate sent down the bill upon tonnage, in which they have concurred with amendments—these amendments being read, the order of the day was called for, when the House went into a committee of the whole; and the subject of yesterday's debate was resumed: The committee sat until near four o'clock, and then rose without coming to a vote upon the question.

FRIDAY, JUNE 19.

House met agreeably to adjournment, and formed itself into a committee of the whole, upon the bill for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. The motion which had been under debate since Tuesday, for striking out the clause which empowers the President to remove officers, still under consideration. Lengthy debates ensued—sketches of which shall appear in our next. The question upon the motion being at length taken, it passed in the negative, 33 being in favor of retaining the clause, and 20 against it.

The committee then proceeded in the discussion of the bill.

Mr. BENSON proposed the following clause for insertion, viz. That the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs immediately after his appointment, be impowered to take into his custody all the books and papers belonging to the late Department of Foreign Affairs established by the United States in Congress assembled: This clause was adopted.

The further discussion of the bill produced some alterations and amendments, which being completed, the committee rose, and the chairman made his report. The Speaker having taken the chair, a message was received by the Secretary from the Senate, with the impost bill, informing the Honorable House that they insisted on some of the amendments which they had proposed, and receded from others.

The Secretary also informed the Honorable House, that the committee appointed to view the rooms in the Federal Hall, had proceeded in that business and made a partial report, which was now sent down for concurrence.——Adjourned until Monday.

[*The Debates of the Hon. House of Representatives of the United States upon the Clause in the Bill for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, which empowers The President to remove the Officer at the head of that department, without advice of Senate, have been highly interesting, animated, and ingenious. The galleries have been unusually crouded, notwithstanding the heat of the weather; and the most profound attention observed. The zeal and earnestness, with which the several speakers have supported the argument on both sides of the question, fully demonstrate the deep conviction which they felt of the importance of the subject. This discussion has served to unfold and explain the principles of the Constitution; and the extreme anxiety which has been shewn to adhere to its spirit and meaning, by every one of the Speakers, evinces that they all consider it as the only rule of their Faith and Practice, in the course of their Political Existence.*]

DOMESTIC ARTICLES.

SAVANNA, MAY 28.

Extract of a letter from Col. Maxwell to Lieut. Col. Fiſhbourn, dated Midway (Liberty-County) May 24.

"Laſt Tueſday there was a train of Indians diſcovered, making for this ſettlement, by a few men employed as ſpies. I immediately iſſued out orders for embodying the militia, and three ſmall parties were collected on the frontiers that night. On Wedneſday morning, as ſoon as Dr. Le Conte's negroes turned out of the fort, the Indians attempted to ſeize on them. Six fellows went out with guns; as ſoon as the negroes diſcovered the Indians, they made back for the fort, and the Indians purſued them; there were ſome negroes in the fort with arms, who, with the Doctor, fired on them, whilſt thoſe who went out armed attacked them in the rear, which ſoon made them retreat, with ſome loſs, to a fence, where they kept up a heavy fire at the fort, for ſome time, without effect. They carried off three negroes. Several parties of men ſoon got to the place, but purſued without waiting to collect a force ſufficient to attack them. Capt. Fraſer, with a ſmall party, came up with them on the ſide of a ſwamp, which they immediately ran into, and prevented his charging them. It appears from the beſt accounts, that there are at leaſt fifty in that party. The next morning they killed a man at a plantation of Capt. Sander's, juſt below the one which he now plants; and on Friday night they attacked a ſmall guard within a mile and a half of me, the guard beat them off with the loſs of one man killed. They carried off a negro wench and a child a ſmall diſtance from the place, ſtabbed the wench in ſeveral places with a knife, ſcalped her, and killed the child; the wench has come in, but is not expected to live. Yeſterday evening, at Mr. Stephen Baker's, three of his negroes went over the fence, who were fired on, and a wench killed and ſcalped. An attempt to plunder was likewiſe made at Mr. James Wood's on Friday, but the negroes diſcovered the ſavages at a diſtance, and made their eſcape. They ſeem to have ſeparated into ſmall parties, and to be all round us. A party is to go out to morrow morning. It is thought, by the different trails that have been diſcovered ſince, that there are other parties come into the ſettlements beſides that which attacked Le Conte; if ſo, there is no telling what their numbers are."

The two men killed by the Indians in Liberty county were, Mr. Grimes and Mr. James Cole.

WINCHESTER, JUNE 3.

[*From a Correſpondent.*] "A great majority of the Houſe of Repreſentatives in Congreſs, appear to be a band of patriots: It may be obſerved in the Debates, however, that ſome gentlemen who paſs for men of ſenſe, are againſt a diſcrimination on tonnage. This is a matter of aſtoniſhment to a perſon who ſees that the ſale of American oil and rice in France, is ſuperior to all advantages in commerce that Britain can give the United States. Britain diſplays ſuch rapacity for ſelf-intereſt and monopoly, that no American of liberal ſentiments can heſitate to make a diſcrimination between her and France. They who do, appear to be ignorant of the intereſts of the United States, or fail to purſue it.

"Do theſe gentlemen intend that we ſhall be as paſſive in our traffic with Europe as the Turks are? The Dutch, Engliſh, and French, carry their commodities, and ſell them in the Turkiſh dominions, and bring back the commodities of Turkey in the ſame bottom: Hence ariſes the great difficulty which the Porte labours under to man and maintain a navy, notwithſtanding the abſolute power of this Court. Such men diſcover a timid diffidence which borders on meaneſs—they are afraid to do what is abſolutely neceſſary, to eſtabliſh a revenue, and conſequently, the credit of their country, leaſt the Britiſh ſhould do ſomething to counteract it: Such puſilanimous conduct will never command reſpect in commerce or in war.

"It is obſerved by ſome gentlemen, that Britain takes our flax ſeed—It is not to oblige us; it is becauſe it anſwers far better, and with more certainty of a crop than ſeed from Holland, or any part of the European continent—that they take our potaſh and naval ſtores. If the bad blood which originated in the armed neutrality, ſhould get a little more inflamed, Britain would be obliged to depend on us in a great meaſure for pitch, tar, turpentine, and other naval ſtores. Ruſſia and Denmark will not ſupply her, and ſo many of the Swedes will be employed in arms, that they cannot furniſh her with a ſufficient quantity. In this ſituation, I would uſe the Britons with civility, and eſtabliſh more of a reciprocity in trade, than their ſhort ſighted policy, and intereſted ſelfiſh views would permit them to grant to America.

"Beſides the other great obligations which the United States lie under to France, we owe them a large ſum of money; and notwithſtanding the unfortunate ſituation of their own finances, they forbear to preſs us: Our ingratitude to France would be next to our ingratitude to Heaven: She was an inſtrument in the hand of Providence, to bring us to what we are.

"A great deal has been ſaid on the ſcarcity of ſhipping to carry the bulky commodities of America to market. It is generally allowed, that the States to the eaſtward have more ſhipping than is neceſſary for their own carriage: Let them by all means have the preference—What they get is all in the family. They are an induſtrious enterpriſing people—and knowing their intereſt, and being attached to it, will prevent their being exorbitant in their demands for freight, as it would operate againſt them, and induce every ſtate to provide themſelves in ſhipping as faſt as poſſible, to ſerve their own purpoſes.

"Let a perſon of judgment, acquainted with ſhipping and materials for building, conſider the immenſe quantities of live oak and cedar in the Southern States; and pines ſo lofty, that it tires the eye to look at the top; many of them four feet diameter—and he will ſee, that an active enterpriſing people will, in a ſhort time, not only ſupply the United States with ſhipping ſufficient for their own carriage, but will carry on a profitable commerce by building, freighting, and ſelling the ſhips in Europe.

"It is diſagreeable to obſerve ſome men inſiſt on lowering the impoſt, before they know the amount of it, or are informed of the ſums of money neceſſary for the ſupport of government, the payment of the intereſt of our debts, and for eſtabliſhing a ſinking fund to pay off the principal debts by inſtallments: The ſpeeches of ſuch perſons ſerve only to expoſe them to ridicule, and prove how incompetent they are to eſtabliſh a revenue, and make laws for a great and riſing empire.

"America has great reaſon to thank Providence that a large majority of the Houſe of Repreſentatives diſcover greater abilities and more knowledge of the Times.

BOSTON, JUNE 13.

Yeſterday the joint committee of the legiſlature reported to the Hon. Senate, the addreſs to THE PRESIDENT of the United States.

That firm reliance on Heaven—that ſpirit of piety, and moderation—which breathes in every line which has come from THE PRESIDENT, will remain a record to poſterity, as honorable as his brilliant atchievements both in the field and the cabinet—and will perpetuate his fame more than the ſong of the poet—the page of the hiſtorian—the marble monument, or ſtudied inſcription.

NEW-YORK, JUNE 20, 1789.

A FEDERAL SONG.

For the Anniverſary of AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.

To the tune of "RULE BRITANNIA."

I.

YE friends to this auſpicious day!
Come join the fed'ral, feſtive band,
And all Columbia—homage pay
To him who freed thy happy land.
Hail Columbia! Columbia's Genius, hail!
Freedom ever ſhall prevail.

II.

Brave, juſt, and generous, wiſe, ſincere,
Thy virtues cheer each drooping *Son*;
And thy proud Rivals—half revere
Columbia's Genius, *WASHINGTON.*
Hail Columbia! &c.

III.

No more ſhall Envy blaſt our fame,
Or Jealouſy our hearts divide,
The *BAND OF BROTHERS*—now proclaim
The knot indiſſolubly ty'd.
Hail Columbia! &c.

IV.

No more ſhall Diſcord cloud the day
That gave to INDEPENDENCE birth,
Henceforth we'll ſpurn the—Fiend away,
And drown our fears in wine and mirth.
Hail Columbia! &c.

V.

Now *LIBERTY*, by HEAV'N's command,
Returns to bleſs Columbia's ſhore;
Well pleas'd, ſhe views the—happy land,
And cries, I'll wander now no more.
Hail Columbia! &c.

VI.

In this my laſt aſylum bleſt,
Columbia ſhall my Empire own,
And *HE* who won me—ſtand confeſt
The faithful guardian of my throne.
Hail Columbia! &c.

VII.

COMMERCE ſhall rear her drooping head,
And open all her copious ſtores,
Her ſhips their lofty—pinions ſpread,
To waft them to remoteſt ſhores.
Hail Columbia! &c.

VIII.

Ye FAIR who grace Columbia's plains!
To you my Sons ſhall homage pay,
And though they ſcorn a—tyrant's chains,
Shall bow to Beauty's ſov'reign ſway.
Hail Columbia! &c.

IX.

On this bright dawn of HALCYON days,
Let fed'ral friends in concert join
To pour, while they the—flaſk can raiſe
Libations to the God of Wine.
Hail Columbia! Columbia's Genius, hail!
Freedom ever ſhall prevail.

E. C.

The important deciſion on the motion, for ſtriking out a clauſe in the bill which had been for ſeveral days before the committee of the Houſe of Repreſentatives of the United States, has quieted the fears of many friends to the Union, who had been uneaſy, leſt the blending of the Legiſlative and Executive Powers of Government, ſhould at ſome future period have produced diſſentions, corruption and debility, in the Legiſlature of the United States.

His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's Packet *Le Telemaque*, L'HOTELIER commander, will ſail for Bourdeaux the firſt of July next.

THE PRESIDENT has been indiſpoſed with a ſlight fever, for a few days paſt; but the public anxiety may be abated, by the *aſſurance* that he is now much better.

We are informed, that His Excellency THOMAS JEFFERSON, Miniſter Plenipotentiary from the United States to the Court of France, has requeſted leave to viſit America: and that THE PRESIDENT has granted him permiſſion accordingly.

We further learn, that this event was made known to the Senate on Wedneſday laſt by a meſſage from THE PRESIDENT, who at the ſame time was pleaſed to nominate WILLIAM SHORT, Eſq. *Charge des Affaires* for the United States, at that Court, during the abſence of Mr. JEFFERSON.

The nomination, we hear, is confirmed by the Senate.

Every friend to the happineſs and freedom of America, contemplates with pleaſure, the increaſe and diffuſion of learning in theſe riſing States.—A laudable ſpirit pervades the various ſocieties and aſſociations of citizens, to extend the means of knowledge and information. Schools and other ſeminaries of learning, are continually encreaſing—the inhabitants of this city diſcover a laudable ambition on this account—and the public papers are daily announcing the literary improvements, and exhibitions of the youth, taught at the ſeveral academies.

The exhibition of the pupils of Mr. HARDIE, at the city-tavern, on Wedneſday evening, was attended by a very large and reſpectable company. The performances of the ſeveral parts aſſigned to the young gentlemen, gave great pleaſure to the ſpectators. The grace, the animation and propriety, of the action and pronunciation of the ſeveral ſcholars, were honorary to themſelves, and reflected great credit upon their preceptor.

The 11th inſt. being the day for the general aſſembly of the State of Rhode Iſland, agreeable to a reſolve paſſed at their late ſeſſion, to take into conſideration a motion made for calling a convention, to adopt the new conſtitution—the ſame was accordingly taken up, and after the matter was diſcuſſed, the vote was taken, and there was a majority of eleven againſt calling a convention. The motion made for repealing the tender law was alſo taken into conſideration, and it alſo paſſed in the negative, by a majority of *ſeven*.

The diminution of the majority againſt the Federal Conſtitution in the State of Rhode-Iſland, is indicative of the complete triumph of reaſon and common ſenſe over the power of anarchy, ſelfiſhneſs and party views: Rhode-Iſland and North-Carolina will undoubtedly ſoon be reſtored to the Union, when there will be more joy over two returning wanderers, than over eleven dutiful ſons, who have never ſtrayed from the Temple of Union.

The friends to the conſtitution of the United States, may rejoice in every circumſtance that has attended its progreſs, from the beginning: The oppoſition to it, called forth in its defence and ſupport the nobleſt faculties of the human mind: The full, free and unbounded diſcuſſion of its merits and defects, has ſerved to emblazon its preponderating excellencies in ſuch manner, that its foundation is extended, and made more firm and durable, than its moſt ſanguine friends could have anticipated.

In proportion as knowledge diffuſes itſelf, liberty ſpreads its genial rays. The French now make themſelves happy in the idea of a free preſs: Thoſe generous ſpirits who are burning with the flame of liberty, are now engaged in forming a ſcheme for the more equal repreſentation of the people in the Etats Generaux; which they juſtly conſider as the firſt gleam of liberty. An enlightened people collected into an aſſembly by equal repreſentation, will ſoon acquire through their means every right that belongs naturally to man.

OUR COUNTRY.

WHAT an happy aſylum does America preſent to the wretched inhabitants of the old world! Here—where vaſt tracts of country boaſt a ſoil and climate equal to the moſt fertile kingdoms of Europe! Here—where no lordly deſpot uſurps the land to diſpoſſeſs the ſwain—where laws, and equal liberty are the lot of *all*—Here are they invited! Induſtry! eſpecially in the United States, calls for an acceſſion of artiſts; and agriculture alone is capable of maintaining thoſe thouſands and tens of thouſands, who periſh in ſupporting the falſe claims of Princes. The men, who muſt loſe their lives in a ſingle battle, accompanied with ſome of thoſe damſels, who ſacrifice their days in convents to family pride under the maſk of devotion, would eaſily find that proviſion in any of our States, whether new or old, which would induce them to exchange a life of rapine or of celibacy, for the comforts of domeſtic life. Profligacy, which ranges at large in courts, camps, cities, and villages, would here be rendered uſeful to ſociety. Religion, inſtead of being confined to a convent, like a candle under a buſhel, might illuminate regions as yet in Pagan darkneſs; large diſtricts where the foot of man has ſcarcely trod, might be turned into *Edens*; and the golden age, which never exiſted but in the brains of enthuſiaſts, might in ſome degree be realized in the *American* republics.

Of STYLES and TITLES.

HOW is it, if titles are not conſiſtent with the genius of the people of America, as is aſſerted by ſome—that in almoſt all the *Conſtitutions* of the ſeveral States, there are *expreſs* proviſions made, for titles of diſtinction for the Supreme and other magiſtrates? And how is it, that common conſent in every State, ſo readily agrees to the ſtyle of *Honorable* being given to various officers—ſuch as Counſellors, Judges of various tribunals, Preſidents of political bodies, Generals, &c. if they are *really* repugnant to the *feelings* and *wiſhes* of the people? *Maſſ. Centinel.*

ARRIVALS. NEW-YORK.

Wedneſday,	Packet Telemaque, L'Hotelier,	Bourdeaux.
Thurſday,	Ship Flora, Sinnolt,	Newry, 36 days.
	Schooner Rebecca, Gale,	Nova-Scotia, 24 days.
Friday,	Schooner Dove, Riggs,	Baltimore, 15 days.
	—— Sydney, Todd,	do. 11 days,
	Sloop Polly, Sowers,	Phiadelphia, 3 days.

The RIGHT CONSTITUTION *of a* COMMONWEALTH EXAMINED.

Continued from our laſt.

If, in reading hiſtory, the gloſſes and reflections of hiſtorians are taken implicitly, a miſtaken judgment will often be formed. Rome was an ariſtocracy, and Livy an ariſtocratical writer. The conſtitution of government, the principles, prejudices, and manners of the times, ſhould never be a moment out of ſight. If we believe the Romans, Manlius was actuated only by envy and ambition; but if we conſider his actions, and the form of government at the time, we ſhould be very apt to pronounce him both a greater and a better man than Camillus. To ſpeak candidly, there was a rivalry between the Manlian and the Quintian families, and the ſtruggle was which ſhould be the firſt family, and who the firſt man: and ſuch a ſtruggle exiſts, not only in every empire, monarchy, republic, but in every city, town, and village, in the world. But a philoſopher might find as good reaſon to ſay that Manlius was ſacrificed to the envy, jealouſy, and ambition of Camillus and the Quintii, as that his popular endeavours for the plebeians ſprung from envy of Camillus, and ambition to be the firſt man. Both were heads of parties, and had all the paſſions incident to ſuch a ſituation: but if a judgment muſt be pronounced which was the beſt man and citizen, there are very ſtrong arguments in favor of Manlius. The name of King was abhorred by the Romans. But who and what had made it ſo? Brutus, and his brother ariſtocrates, at the expulſion of Tarquin, by appointing religious execrations to be pronounced in the name of the whole State, and for all ſucceeding ages, againſt ſuch as ſhould dare to aſpire to the throne. In this way any word or any thing may be made unpopular, at any time and in any nation. The Senate were now able to ſet up the popular cry, that Manlius aſpired to the throne; this revived all the religious horror which their eſtabliſhed execrations had made an habitual part of their natures, and turned an ignorant ſuperſtitious populace againſt the beſt friend, and the only friend they had in the republic. The Senate firſt talked of aſſaſſination and another Ahala; but, to be very gentle, they ordered "the magiſtrates to "take care that the commonwealth ſuſtained no prejudice from "the pernicious deſigns of Manlius." This was worſe than private aſſaſſination; it was an aſſaſſination by the Senate: it was judgment, ſentence, and execution, without trial. The timid ſtaring people were intimidated, and even the tribunes caught the panic, and offered to take the odium off the Senate, and cite Manlius before the tribunal of the people themſelves, and accuſe him in form. It is impoſſible not to ſuſpect, nay fully to believe, that theſe tribunes were bribed ſecretly by the Senators. They not only abandoned him with whom they had co-operated, but they betrayed the people, their conſtituents, in the moſt infamous manner. They ſaid, that in the preſent diſpoſition Manlius could not be openly attacked without intereſting the people in his defence; that violent meaſures would excite a civil war; that it was neceſſary to ſeparate the intereſts of Manlius from thoſe of the people: they themſelves could cite him before the tribunal of the people, and accuſe him in form. Nothing, ſaid the tribunes, is leſs agreeable to the people than a King: as ſoon as the multitude ſees that your aim is not againſt them; that from protectors they are become judges; that their tribunes are the accuſers, and that *a partrician is accuſed* for having aſpired at the tyranny, no intereſt will be ſo dear to them as that of their liberty. Their liberty! The liberty of plebeians at that time! What a proſtitution of ſacred terms! Yet, groſs as was this artifice, it laid faſt hold of thoſe blind prejudices which patricians and ariſtocrates had inſpired, and duped effectually a ſtupid populace. Manlius was cited by the tribunes before the people: in a mourning habit he appeared, without a ſingle Senator, relation, or friend, or even his own brothers, to expreſs concern for his fate: and no wonder; a Senator, and a perſon of conſular dignity, was never known to have been ſo univerſally abandoned. But nothing can be more falſe than the reflections of hiſtorians upon this occaſion: "So "much did the love of liberty, and the fear of being enſlaved, "prevail in the hearts of the Romans over all the ties of blood "and nature!" it was not love of liberty, but abſolute fear which ſeized the people. The Senate had already condemned him by their vote, and given their conſuls dictatorial power againſt Manlius and his friends: the tribunes themſelves were corrupted with bribes or fear; and no man dared expoſe himſelf to ariſtocratical vengeance, unprotected by the tribunes. To prove that it was fear, and not patriotiſm, that reſtrained his relations and friends, we need only recollect another inſtance. When Appius Claudius, the decemvir, was impriſoned for treaſon, much more clear than that of Manlius, and for conduct as wicked, brutal, and cruel, as Manlius's appears virtuous, generous, and humane, the whole Claudian family, even C. Claudius, his profeſſed enemy, appeared as ſuppliants before the judges, imploring mercy for their relation. His friends were not afraid. Why? becauſe Claudius was an enemy and hater of the people, and therefore popular with moſt of the patricians. His crimes were ariſtocratical crimes, therefore not only almoſt venial, but almoſt virtues. Manlius's offence was love of the people; and democratical miſdemeanors are the moſt unpardonable of all that can be committed or conceived in a government where the dæmon of ariſtocracy domineers. Livy himſelf betrays a conſciouſneſs of the inſufficiency of the evidence to prove Manlius's guilt: he ſays he can diſcover no proof, nor any other charge of any crime of treaſon, "regni crimen," except ſome aſſemblies of people, ſeditious ſpeeches, generoſity to debtors, and the falſe inſinuation of the concealment of the gold. But here we ſee what the people are when they meet in one aſſembly with the Senators: they dare not vote againſt the opinion or will of the nobles and patricians. The ariſtocratical part of mankind ever did, and ever will, overawe the people, and carry what votes they pleaſe in general, when they meet together with the democratical part, either in a collective or repreſentative aſſembly. Thus it happened here: ſuperſtition decided. While in ſight of the capital, their religious reverence for the abode of Jupiter, ſaved and inhabited by Manlius, was a counterbalance to their fears and veneration for the Senators deſcended from the gods. The people could not condemn him in ſight of the capital. The tribunes knowing what was in them, adjourned to another place the next day. The capital out of ſight, and the Senators preſent, condemned their deliverer, and he died a ſacrifice to the rancorous envy of his peers in the Senate, the conſulate, and patrician order, who could not bear the ſight of ſo ſplendid a diſtinction and elevation above themſelves, in any one of their order, as Manlius's houſe upon the capital, and his title of Capitolinus. "Homines pro-"pe quadringentos produxiſſe dicitur, quibus ſine fœnore ex-"penſas pecunias tuliſſet, quorum bona venire, quos duci ad-"dictos prohibuiſſet. Ad hæc, decora quoque belli non com-"memoraſſe tantùm, ſed protuliſſe etiam conſpicienda; ſpolia "hoſtium cæſorum ad triginta, dona imperatorum ad quadra-"ginta, in quibus inſiegs duas murales coronas, civicas octo. Ad "hæc ſervatos ex hoſtibus cives produxiſſe, inter quos, C. Ser-"vilium magiſtrum equitum, abſentem nominatum: et, quum "ea quoque quæ bello geſta eſſent, pro faſtigio rerum, oratione "etiam magnifica facta dictis æquando, memoraſſet, nudaſſe "pectus inſign: cicatricibus bello acceptis; et identidem capito-"lium ſpectans Jovem, deoſque alios devocaſſe ad auxilium for-"tunarum ſuarum: precatuſque eſſe, ut, quam mentem ſibi Ca-"pitolinam arcem protegenti ad ſalutem populi Romani dediſ-"ſent, eam populo Romano in ſuo diſcrimine darent: et oraſſe "ſingulos univerſoſque, ut capitolium atque arcem intuentes, ut "ad deos immortales verſi, de ſe judicarent."

By removing the aſſembly from the Campus Martius, where the people were aſſembled in centuries (centuriatim), to the Grove (Petelinum Lucum), from whence the capital could not be ſeen, obſtinatis animis triſte judicium, with gloomy obſtinacy the fatal ſentence was paſſed, and the tribunes caſt him down from the Tarpeian rock. "Such was the cataſtrophe," ſays Livy, "of a man who, if he had not lived in a free city, would "have merited fame." He ſhould have ſaid, if he had not lived in a ſimple ariſtocracy, and alarmed the envy of his fellow ariſtocrates by ſuperiour merit, ſervices, and rewards, eſpecially that moſt conſpicuous mark, his houſe upon the capitol, and his new title, or agnomen, Capitolinus, which mortal envy could not bear.

He was no ſooner dead than the people repented and regretted him: a ſudden plague that broke out was conſidered as a judgment from Heaven upon the nation, for having poluted the capital with the blood of its deliverer.

The hiſtory of Manlius is an unanſwerable argument againſt a ſimple ariſtocracy; it is a proof that no man's liberty or life is ſafe in ſuch a government: the more virtue and merit he has, the more in danger, the more certain his deſtruction. It is a good argument againſt a ſtanding ſovereign and ſupreme authority in an hereditary ariſtocracy; ſo far Nedham quotes it pertinently, and applies it juſtly: but when the ſame example is cited to prove that the people in one ſupreme aſſembly, ſucceſſively choſen, are the beſt keepers of their liberty, ſo far from proving the propoſition, it proves the contrary, becauſe that Camillus, the Quintii, and Manlius, will all be choſen into that one aſſembly by the people; the ſame emulation and rivalry, the ſame jealouſy and envy, the ſame ſtruggles of families and individuals for the firſt place, will ariſe between them. One of them will have the rich and great for his followers, another the poor; hence will ariſe two or three, or more parties, which will never ceaſe to ſtruggle till war and bloodſhed decides which is the ſtrongeſt. Whilſt the ſtruggle continues, the laws are trampled on, and the rights of the citizens invaded by all parties in turn; and when it is decided, the leader of the victorious army is emperor and deſpot.

(To be continued.)

An ESSAY *on* FREE TRADE *and* FINANCES:

Written by a citizen of Philadelphia, in 1783.

[*Continued from our laſt.*]

VII. This mode of taxing *will give our treaſury ſome compenſation for the monies which our people pay towards the tax of other countries which they travel through, or reſide in, when abroad.* An American cannot travel through any country of Europe, and drink a bowl of punch or eat a dinner, but he contributes to the tax of the country; and if our taxes, like theirs, were laid on ſuch luxurious conſumptions as travellers uſually indulge themſelves in, their people who travel through our country or reſide in it, would contribute towards our taxes, in like manner as our people who travel or reſide in their countries, contribute to theirs; and as we expect that the intercourſe between us and all the countries of Europe will be very great, it is highly reaſonable that our treaſury ſhould receive the ſame benefit from their travellers among us, that their treaſuries receive from our people who travel or reſide among them, and a little attention to the ſubject, will be ſufficient to convince any man, that this article is more than a trifle.

IX. This mode of taxing, which brings the burden of the tax principally on articles of luxury, or at moſt on articles of not the firſt neceſſity, *gives eaſement and relief to our huſbandry and manufactures, which are in danger of ruin from the preſent weight of taxes which lies on them.* If we tax land, we leſſen its value, and of courſe diminiſh the whole farming intereſt. If we tax poles, we in effect tax labor, which diſcourages it, and of conſequence we caſt a damp and deadening langour on the very firſt ſprings, the original principle and ſource of our national wealth, and wound the great ſtaples of the country in their embrio. Now I think that any mode of taxing, which gives remedy and relief, againſt ſo great, ſo fatal an evil, would deſerve conſideration, even though it had not theſe advantages in its favor, which I have before enumerated. I have heard a ſtupid and cruel argument urged, that taxing labor has this advantage, that it promotes induſtry, becauſe it increaſes neceſſity. This argument proves in a very cogent manner, that 'tis beſt to make every body poor, becauſe it will make them work the harder. I ſhould think it would be more humane and liberal in a government to manage the public adminiſtration ſo, that induſtry might have all poſſible encouragement, that it might be rather animated by an increaſe of happineſs and hope of reward, than goaded on by dire neceſſity, and the dreadful ſpurs of pinching want. I freely give it as my clear and decided opinion, that 'tis the intereſt, duty and beſt policy of every government, to give all poſſible eaſe, exoneration, and encouragement to that induſtry, thoſe occupations and kinds of buſineſs which moſt enrich, ſtrengthen, and happify a nation, and to lay the burdens of government as far as poſſible on thoſe faſhions, habits and practices, which tend to weaken, impoveriſh and corrupt the people, and therefore that any mode of taxing which tends to encourage the firſt of theſe and diſcourage the laſt, is worthy of the moſt ſerious attention.

But perhaps the advantage of this kind of taxation will appear in a more ſtriking light, by conſidering its practical and general effects, on a nation which adopts it, in which view of the matter I think it will be very manifeſt.

I. That any man of buſineſs, whether he be merchant, farmer or tradeſman, *may live eaſier and better, i. e. be happier through the year and richer at the end of it, in a country where this tax is paid,* than he could live in the ſame country, *if the tax was not paid*; for as the tax is laid on uſeleſs conſumptions, it would of courſe diminiſh thoſe conſumptions, and of courſe ſave the firſt coſt of the part diminiſhed, and all the additional expence which the uſe of that part would require. If a man lives in a country abounding in luxury, he muſt go in ſome degree into it or appear ſingular and mean, and that part which he would be in a manner compelled to adopt, would probably coſt him more than his tax; but 'tis here to be conſidered, that the *firſt coſt* of an article of luxury, is not near *all the coſt of it.* One article often makes another neceſſary, and that a third, and ſo on almoſt *ad infinitum*, if you buy a ſilk cloak, there muſt alſo be trimings, and that will not do without a hat or bonnet, and there requires a ſuitable accomodation in every other part of the dreſs, in order to keep up any ſort of decency and uniformity of appearance, and there alſo muſt be ſpent a great deal of time to put theſe fine things on, and to wear them, to ſhow them, to receive and pay viſits, in them, &c. And when this kind of luxury prevails in a country beyond the degree which its wealth can bear; the conſequence is pride, poverty, debt, duns, lawſuits, &c. &c. The farmer finds the proceeds of the year vaniſhed into trifles; the merchant and tradeſman may ſell their goods indeed, but can't get payment for them. Every family finds its expence greatly increaſed, and the time of the family much conſumed in attending to that very expence. Many families ſoon become embarraſſed, and put to very mortifying ſhifts to keep up that appearance, which ſuch a corrupt taſt almoſt compels them to ſupport: But were theſe families with the ſame income, to live in a country of more œconomy and leſs luxury, they would eaſily pay the taxes on the luxuries they did uſe, keep on a good footing with their neighbours—appear with as much diſtinction—live happy and unembarraſſed through the year, and have money in their pockets at the end of it. In ſuch a country, payments would be punctual, and induſtry ſteady, and of courſe all buſineſs both of merchandize, huſbandry and mechanic arts, might be carried on with eaſe and ſucceſs. Theſe are no high colourings, but an appeal to plain facts, and I here with confidence aſk every wiſe man, if he would not chooſe to live in a country where articles of hurtful luxury and uſeleſs conſumption, were by taxes or any other cauſe, raiſed ſo high in their price, as to prevent the exceſſive uſe of them, rather than in a country where ſuch articles were of eaſy acquirement, and the uſe of them ſo exceſſive among the inhabitants, as to conſume their wealth, deſtroy their induſtry, and corrupt the morals and health of the people.

II. I think it is very plain, that articles of hurtful and uſeleſs conſumption are making ſuch rapid progreſs among us, and growing into ſuch exceſſive uſe, as to throw the economy, induſtry, ſimplicity, and even health of our people into danger, and of conſequence *raiſing the price of ſuch articles ſo high as will be neceſſary to produce a proper check to the exceſſive uſe of them, will require a tax ſo great, as when added to a ſmall and very moderate impoſt on articles of general and neceſſary conſumption, will bring money enough into the public treaſury, for all the purpoſes of the public ſervice.* We will ſuppoſe then that all this is done, and when this is done, we will ſtop a moment and look round us, and view the advantages reſulting from this meaſure, over and above the capital one of checking and reſtraining that exceſſive luxury that threatens, if not an abſolute deſtruction, yet at leaſt a tarniſhment of every principle out of which our proſperity, wealth and happineſs muſt neceſſarily and forever flow. I ſay, we'll ſtop a minute and view the advantageous effects of this meaſure. The firſt grand effect which preſents itſelf to my view is, that *our army would be paid*, that our brethren, our fellow citizens, who, by their valor, their patience, their perſeverance in the field, have ſecured to us our vaſt extenſive country, and all its bleſſings will be enabled to return to their friends and connexions, not only crowned with the laurels of the field, but rewarded by the juſtice and gratitude of their country, and be thereby enabled to ſupport their dignity of character, or at leaſt be put on a footing with their fellow-citizens (whom they have ſaved) in the procurement of the means of living.

The next advantage of this meaſure which occurs to me is, *the eaſement and exonoration of the laborers of the community, the huſbandman and tradeſman*, out of whoſe labour all our wealth and ſupplies are derived, by them we are fed, by them we are cloathed, by the various modifications of their labour, our ſtaples are produced, our commerce receives its principle, and our utmoſt abundance is ſupplied, we are therefore bound by every principle of juſtice, gratitutude and good policy, to give them encouragement and uninterupted ſecurity in their peaceful occupations, and not by an unnatural and ill-fated arrangement of our finances, compel them to leave their labours, which are the grand object of their attention and our ſupplies, to go and hunt up money to ſatisfy a collector of taxes.

(To be continued).

NATIONAL MONITOR.——No. IX.

"The traveller who o'er the country *flies*,
"Few ſubjects with a juſt diſcernment ſpies;
"Objects that paſs ſo *quick*, confound the mind,
"And no diſtinct ideas leave behind."

AN ingenious writer in ſome of our public papers, hath obſerved, that to compleat the education of thoſe youth, who may be deſtined to public life in the Legiſlature of the Union, ſuch an intimate acquaintance with the ſeveral States is neceſſary, as can be obtained only by a temporary reſidence *in each—and from hence inferred the importance of making the tour of the continent.*

The knowledge that is derived from ſtudy, however, ſyſtematic and theoretic, is often found inadequate—an acquaintance with the real ſtate of facts furniſhes irreſiſtable arguments, when the moſt ingenious theories prove radically defective—hence we find that experience *has the advantage of ſpeculation; and an accurate idea of poſitive, exiſting circumſtances, a great ſuperiority in leading to the beſt deciſions upon all occaſions.*

The tour of this continent is without doubt of as much conſequence to the citizens of theſe States, as that of Europe ever was to the inhabitants of Great-Britain, and in many reſpects of much greater.

In Europe they travel to acquire a knowlege of the habits, manners, laws, hiſtory, &c. of foreign *countries.*

Americans ſhould travel to obtain juſt ideas of the various and diverſified people who compoſe not a foreign nation, but one in whoſe fate their own is immediately involved.

Let it not be ſaid, that variety, novelty, antiquity, and ſplendor are wanting to excite the attention, to amuſe, to animate, and inſtruct the American traveller—America was always an object of delightful contemplation to the philoſopher in every part of the globe—but ſince the adoption of the new conſtitution—She is raiſed to a moſt reſpectable grade in the ſcale of nations—and her progreſs to perfection opens a new field of ſpeculation to the human mind. That information therefore which can be derived from travel only, is now become of infinite importance to the legiſlators, the ſtateſmen and the patriots of our country. C.

(The ſubject to be continued.)

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TWENTY-SIX
LETTERS,
UPON *INTERESTING SUBJECTS*,
RESPECTING THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICA.
Written in Holland in the Year M, DCC, LXXX.
BY HIS EXCELLENCY *JOHN ADAMS*,
WHILE HE WAS SOLE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FOR NEGOCIATING A PEACE, AND A TREATY OF COMMERCE, WITH GREAT-BRITAIN.

ADVERTISEMENT.
Prefixed to the Letters.

DR. CALKOEN, an eminent Civilian at Amſterdam, to whom theſe letters were written, compoſed, by the means of them, a compariſon between the revolt of the Low Countries from Spain, and the revolution of the United States of America; in which he concluded, upon the whole, that "as it was a kind of miracle that the former ſucceeded, it would be a greater "miracle ſtill if the latter ſhould not."—This compoſition was read by him to a ſociety of gentlemen of letters, about forty in number, who met ſometimes at Amſterdam; and by its means juſt ſentiments of American affairs began to ſpread in that country, and to prevail over the continual miſrepreſentations of certain gazettes and emiſſaries—The publications of General HOWE *and* BURGOYNE, *in vindication of themſelves, were procured to be tranſlated into French, and propogated, together with many other pamphlets, which aſſiſted in the ſame deſign, and contributed to excite the citizens to thoſe applications, by petition to the regencies of the ſeveral cities, which finally procured the acknowledgement of American Independency, the Treaty of Commerce, and a Loan of Money.*

JOHN ADAMS.

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